Articles

(Published in The Washington Post, April 27, 2012)

The United States has just lost a key ally in the fight against al-Qaeda terrorists: the residents of Virginia, and state employees in particular.

Virginia’s legislature recently passed a bill that forbids state employees, including police and members of the National Guard, from participating in the investigation, surveillance, detention or arrest of any suspected member of al-Qaeda or its affiliates, if that suspect is a U.S. citizen.

The bill, which Gov. Robert F. McDonnell (R) signed Wednesday, is unconstitutional. It trenches on the federal government’s war powers and violates conditions under which Virginia and other states have received billions of dollars of federal funding. It has dangerous symbolic and practical consequences and undermines the cooperation necessary to disrupt and defeat al-Qaeda plots on our shores.

The basis of this legislation in Virginia and 11 other states (Arizona, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Washington and West Virginia) is a gross misunderstanding or intentional misreading of the detainee provisions in the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

Some members of the tea party and the Tenth Amendment Center, a conservative group devoted to states’ rights, have joined with the American Civil Liberties Union to monger fear over federal detention authority. Under their contorted reading of the act, federal law requires all U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism to be held in military custody and strips them of all constitutional rights.

But although the NDAA describes military custody as the primary policy option for dealing with captured enemy combatants, the president retains, as is constitutionally proper, discretion to utilize the civilian justice and penal systems. In fact, the NDAA did not change settled law at all. It says that “nothing in this section shall be construed to affect existing law” related to the detention of U.S. citizens captured or arrested in the United States. Furthermore, under the Supreme Court’s post-Sept. 11 rulings, especially Hamdi v. Rumsfeld andBoumediene v. Bush , enemy combatants (regardless of citizenship) may be held for the duration of the hostilities, but anyone in military custody, whether in the United States or Guantanamo, is able to exercise habeas corpus rights to challenge the detention.

Despite these facts, some continue to fight what they see as a federal leviathan that acts extra-constitutionally all the time. But the federal government has the primary role in national security. Although comprehensive detention legislation has proved elusive, the language in the NDAA reflects the considered and constitutionally binding judgment of Congress and the president on an issue over which the federal government properly holds sway.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have recruited terrorists in the United States. Under the law of armed conflict — which predates the 2001 attacks — enemy combatants, regardless of citizenship, may be detained for the duration of the hostilities.

Virginia’s new law sends mixed messages to state employees, especially law enforcement officials. Imagine a state trooper pulling over a speeder and finding out through an ID check that the FBI has an alert for the driver as a suspected al-Qaeda operative. What should the trooper do if he knows or suspects the driver is a U.S. citizen? Do his duty and detain the suspect, which violates Virginia law? Or simply write the speeding ticket and send the driver on his way, not telling the FBI or the military, consequences be damned?

Although the federal government has no inherent constitutional right to compel state officials to help in combating al-Qaeda, since 9/11 it has funneled billions of dollars to all states that require fulsome cooperation from state law enforcement authorities. Meanwhile, state National Guard forces, when deployed overseas, are subject to federal control. For these reasons, Virginia’s legislation violates the federal law.

Beyond these practical concerns, Virginia’s legislation, especially if followed by more states, sends a powerful message that delegitimizes not just the military detention of captured enemy combatants but also the entire laws-of-war architecture. Legitimacy of government policies matters a great deal in our democracy. Unfortunately, it already was heavily battered, primarily by the left, during the George W. Bush administration.

The tea party members who are pushing for these state actions may not know that the Obama administration has, after some initial equivocation, endorsed the laws-of-war paradigm and has retained most of the Bush administration’s policies. This extremely positive development provides much-needed bipartisanship in this key area of national policy.

The Virginia legislation, and similar legislation in other states, violate the U.S. Constitution. It has nothing to do with states’ rights. It is a dangerous mistake, perpetrated by groups and people who misunderstand detainee law, including the NDAA, or who, since Sept. 11, have viscerally opposed the laws-of-war paradigm. Whatever their motivations, they are wrong, and their efforts should be strongly opposed.

Virginia’s new law sends mixed messages to state employees, especially law enforcement officials. Imagine a state trooper pulling over a speeder and finding out through an ID check that the FBI has an alert for the driver as a suspected al-Qaeda operative. What should the trooper do if he knows or suspects the driver is a U.S. citizen? Do his duty and detain the suspect, which violates Virginia law? Or simply write the speeding ticket and send the driver on his way, not telling the FBI or the military, consequences be damned?

Although the federal government has no inherent constitutional right to compel state officials to help in combating al-Qaeda, since 9/11 it has funneled billions of dollars to all states that require fulsome cooperation from state law enforcement authorities. Meanwhile, state National Guard forces, when deployed overseas, are subject to federal control. For these reasons, Virginia’s legislation violates the federal law.

Beyond these practical concerns, Virginia’s legislation, especially if followed by more states, sends a powerful message that delegitimizes not just the military detention of captured enemy combatants but also the entire laws-of-war architecture. Legitimacy of government policies matters a great deal in our democracy. Unfortunately, it already was heavily battered, primarily by the left, during the George W. Bush administration.

The tea party members who are pushing for these state actions may not know that the Obama administration has, after some initial equivocation, endorsed the laws-of-war paradigm and has retained most of the Bush administration’s policies. This extremely positive development provides much-needed bipartisanship in this key area of national policy.

The Virginia legislation, and similar legislation in other states, violate the U.S. Constitution. It has nothing to do with states’ rights. It is a dangerous mistake, perpetrated by groups and people who misunderstand detainee law, including the NDAA, or who, since Sept. 11, have viscerally opposed the laws-of-war paradigm. Whatever their motivations, they are wrong, and their efforts should be strongly opposed.

David B. Rivkin Jr. is co-chairman of the Center for Law and Counterterrorism at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a partner at Baker Hostetler. He served in the Justice Department during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations and has represented the 26 states that have challenged the constitutionality of the 2010 Affordable Care Act. Charles D. Stimson, senior legal fellow at the Heritage Foundation, was a deputy assistant secretary for detainee affairs at the Defense Department during the George W. Bush administration.

Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/virginia-detainee-law-is-dangerously-unconstitutional/2012/04/26/gIQANb8zjT_story.html

If the Supreme Court upholds purchase mandates in health care, they will become a mainstay of federal regulation throughout the U.S. economy.

By DAVID B. RIVKIN JR. And LEE A. CASEY

Since the Supreme Court's historic three-day ObamaCare hearings in late March, the president and his supporters have tried to pressure the Justices into upholding that law, asserting that any other decision would overstep the court's constitutional bounds. Ruling against ObamaCare would not be what the president called illegitimate "judicial activism," but an appropriate exercise of the Supreme Court's core constitutional role.

"Judicial activism" is one of those agreeably ambiguous terms that can support almost any criticism of the courts. Under our constitutional system, judicial activism entails judges rewriting rather than interpreting the laws, exercising "will instead of judgment," in Alexander Hamilton's phrase.

Measuring a federal statute like ObamaCare against the Constitution and finding it wanting is not judicial activism. This, as Chief Justice John Marshall noted in the early (1803) and much-quoted Marbury v. Madison case, "is of the very essence of judicial duty."

This duty is not properly limited, as ObamaCare's increasingly desperate supporters claim, to judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights and other affirmative prohibitions on congressional power. The Constitution must be interpreted and applied as a whole, and its basic architecture—in particular the limitations inherent in the enumerated nature of Congress's powers—is just as critical to the defense of individual liberty as are any of the other rights it guarantees.

The Framers assumed that the Constitution's federalist architecture, dividing power between the federal government and the states (creating a "vertical" separation of powers to complement the "horizontal" separation among the three federal branches), would be the primary defense against governmental overreaching. Indeed, Hamilton argued in the Federalist Papers (No. 84) that adoption of a Bill of Rights "would even be dangerous" for the very reason that "[t]hey would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted; and on this very account, would afford a colourable pretext to claim more than were granted."

Accordingly, the Supreme Court always has measured federal statutes against both the Bill of Rights and the Constitution's structural protections. It has struck down laws found wanting in either case.

To uphold ObamaCare's insurance-purchase mandate as a legitimate exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce, the court must find some neutral, judicially enforceable limiting principle that would maintain the Constitution's balance of power between federal and state authority. That principle must keep the power to regulate interstate commerce from morphing into a general power simply to regulate the citizenry. The court has always ruled, correctly, that only the states have such a general "police" power under our Constitution.

No such limiting principle has yet been suggested because none exists. The best government lawyers have done is to claim that Congress imposed the insurance mandate as a means of regulating how people (especially the young and healthy) will pay for the health care they will someday use. That Congress would regulate Americans as future market participants and, having chosen insurance as the regulatory mechanism, it can require everyone to buy that insurance now. This is how insurance works—it must be obtained before the covered eventuality occurs.

But there is nothing magical about "insurance"—for health care or otherwise. If Congress can regulate Americans as future consumers (and everyone is a future consumer in dozens if not hundreds of markets), then it could equally impose any number of mandates on the citizenry today as a means of regulating the transactions in which they are expected to engage tomorrow, next week, or in 40 years.

Such mandates could require prepayment now for commodities or services to be consumed in the future, thereby benefiting today's markets and consumers by injecting additional liquidity and perhaps decreasing their costs. Indeed, Congress could impose even more blatant cross-subsidizing mandates, as it did in ObamaCare, where health-insurance premiums paid by young members of the middle class are expected to defray the costs of health care being consumed by the less affluent.

If upheld, such purchase mandates would become a mainstay of federal regulation, offering Congress an easy way to cure the ill effects of constitutionally proper but economically dysfunctional schemes. With ObamaCare, Congress sought to offset ruinously expensive new insurance industry regulations, which barred normal underwriting considerations, such as a customer's pre-existing conditions, by forcing all Americans to become insurance customers.

An identical approach would permit imposition of a similarly ruinous (but constitutional) "green" car sales requirement on automobile manufacturers, supported by a new (and equally unconstitutional) mandate that all Americans buy a new, "green" car at periodic intervals or pay a penalty. And so it goes.

There is virtually no economically unrealistic regulation—that forces companies to produce goods nobody wants to buy, or sets artificial prices—that could not be salvaged at least in the short run by an offsetting purchase mandate of some kind. Yet in the long run the resort to central planning, effected through such mandates, would fare no better in the U.S. than it did in the Soviet Union.

Although the policy merits of various mandates could be honestly debated, there simply is no neutral, judicially enforceable basis on which courts can determine which prepayment mandates Congress can impose as a means of regulating future transactions and which it cannot. In fact, if the courts were to scrutinize such mandates, as ObamaCare defenders suggest, striking down those they considered to be too onerous or preposterous (such as a "broccoli mandate") the judges truly would be engaged in illegitimate judicial activism.

As the Supreme Court has consistently ruled in the past, the Constitution gives Congress only limited and enumerated powers. However vexing a particular problem may be, Congress can address it using only those powers. If its preferred solution requires the exercise of a power it was denied, such as a general police power, then Congress must think again. If, as in this case, Congress persists in adopting legislation that goes beyond its constitutional authority, the courts must invalidate it. That is not judicial activism. It is the fulfillment of the judiciary's constitutional duty.

Messrs. Rivkin and Casey are lawyers who served in the Justice Department during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. They represented the 26 states in their challenge to ObamaCare before the trial and appellate courts.

A version of this article appeared April 24, 2012, on page A15 in some U.S. editions of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: Overturning ObamaCare Isn't 'Judicial Activism'.

Source: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303425504577355781393852136.html?mod=googlenews_wsj&_nocache=1335276697606&user=welcome&mg=id-wsj

Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce is broad but not limitless.

(published in The Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2012)

By DAVID B. RIVKIN JR. AND LEE A. CASEY

On Monday, the Supreme Court will begin an extraordinary three-day hearing on the constitutionality of ObamaCare. At stake are the Constitution's structural guarantees of individual liberty, which limit governmental power and ensure political accountability by dividing that power between federal and state authorities. Upholding ObamaCare would destroy this dual-sovereignty system, the most distinctive feature of American constitutionalism.

ObamaCare mandates that every American, with a few narrow exceptions, have a congressionally defined minimum level of health-insurance coverage. Noncompliance brings a substantial monetary penalty. The ultimate purpose of this "individual mandate" is to force young and healthy middle-class workers to subsidize those who need more coverage.

Congress could have achieved this wealth transfer in perfectly constitutional ways. It could simply have imposed new taxes to pay for a national health system. But that would have come with a huge political price tag that neither Congress nor the president was prepared to pay.

Instead, Congress adopted the individual mandate, invoking its power to regulate interstate commerce. The uninsured, it reasoned, still use health services (for which some do not pay) and therefore have an impact on commerce, which Congress can regulate.

Congress's reliance on the Commerce Clause to support the individual mandate was politically expedient but constitutionally deficient. Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce is broad but not limitless.

First among the limits is the very nature of congressional authority, which is based on specifically enumerated powers. As the Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged, the Constitution denies the federal government the type of broad public health and welfare regulatory authority known as a "general police power," which is reserved exclusively to the states. The court has also repeatedly held that preservation of this division between federal and state authority is a matter for supervision by the courts, and its precedents make clear that congressional Commerce Clause regulation must be subject to some judicially enforceable limiting principle.

The defining characteristic of a general police power is the states' ability to regulate people simply as people, regardless of an individual's activities or interaction with goods or services that might themselves be subject to regulation. Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled that states, exercising their general police power, can require all resident adults to obtain a smallpox vaccination. Only this type of authority could support ObamaCare's individual mandate, which applies to all Americans as such, regardless of any goods they may buy or own, or any activities in which they might choose to engage.

Congress has crossed a fundamental constitutional line. Neither the fact that every individual has some discernible impact on the economy, nor that virtually everyone will at some point in time use health-care services, is a sufficient basis for federal regulation. Both of these arguments, advanced by ObamaCare's defenders, are flawed because they admit no judicially enforceable limiting principle marking the outer bounds of federal authority.

On the left and right, legal thinkers too often forget that Congress has no constitutional power simply to regulate the economy. Rather, that power comes from a series of discrete authorities—to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, to tax, spend and borrow, to coin money and fix its value and so forth—that together allow it broad control over the nation's economic affairs. As a result, congressional efforts to address national problems may well be less economically efficient than would a more straightforward exercise of police power. The Constitution subordinates efficiency to guarantee liberty.

The Constitution divides governmental power between federal and state governments so that one may check the other. This requires that the electorate be able to tell, especially on Election Day, which government is responsible for which policies and regulations with which we live.

As Justice Anthony Kennedy explained in one leading Commerce Clause case, United States v. Lopez (1995): "The theory that two governments accord more liberty than one [emphasis added] requires for its realization two distinct and discernible lines of political accountability: one between the citizens and the Federal Government; the second between the citizens and the States." Congress's use of its commerce power in passing ObamaCare eradicates those "discernible lines of political accountability."

Even so, Congress's enumerated powers support a vast and ever growing regulatory state, much of it based upon the Commerce Clause. Neither that Leviathan, nor the Supreme Court's precedents upholding it, is now at issue.

Justice Antonin Scalia explained in another of the Supreme Court's recent Commerce Clause cases, Gonzales v. Raich (2005), that the power to regulate interstate commerce, especially in conjunction with the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper [emphasis added] for carrying into execution" its enumerated powers, gives Congress broad authority to reach even local and non-commercial activities when necessary to make legitimate regulatory schemes effective. Raich upheld federal control of purely local cultivation, sale and use of marijuana, and it is often incorrectly cited as support for the individual mandate.

But the Necessary and Proper Clause does not guarantee Congress whatever power it would like to reach its policy goals. That provision supports only otherwise legitimate exercises of Congress's enumerated powers. So under the Commerce Clause, Congress can try to achieve universal coverage through regulating the interstate health-care insurance market, as ObamaCare does, by requiring insurance companies operating in that market to cover pre-existing conditions. Then under the Necessary and Proper clause, Congress could also require employers to collect data on pre-existing conditions from new hires so insurers can better plan.

Requiring all Americans to have health insurance may well create a new revenue stream for insurance companies so as to lessen these new burdens on them, but it does nothing to make these new coverage requirements effective regulations of interstate commerce as the Supreme Court uses that term. In particular, the individual mandate does not prevent avoidance or evasion of these new insurance regulations. Nor does it make compliance easier to police, as was the case in Raich. There, the ability to regulate local marijuana production and use was necessary to make its interstate regulation effective because, as Justice Scalia noted, the homegrown variety "is never more than an instant from the interstate market."

Unlike the regulations at issue in Raich, the individual mandate applies regardless of anyone's interaction with a commodity, service or other activity, like the interstate sale or transport of marijuana, that Congress can legitimately regulate. Put another way, the Controlled Substances Act is about the regulation of drugs, not people. It affects individuals only to the extent that they interact with the substances it proscribes, and it can be avoided by simply avoiding those substances.

Americans cannot escape the individual mandate by any means because it regulates them as people, simply because they are alive and here. That requires police power authority. Permitting Congress to exercise that authority—however important its ultimate goal—is not constitutionally proper and would forever warp the federal-state division of authority.

Messrs. Rivkin and Casey are lawyers who served in the Justice Department during the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations. They represented the 26 states in their challenge to ObamaCare before the trial and appellate courts.

A version of this article appeared Mar. 22, 2012, on page A15 in some U.S. editions of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: The Supreme Court Weighs ObamaCare.

Source: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577291883293776326.html

The Affordable Care Act claims federal power is unlimited. Now the High Court must decide.

(Published in The Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2012)

Few legal cases in the modern era are as consequential, or as defining, as the challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that the Supreme Court hears beginning Monday. The powers that the Obama Administration is claiming change the structure of the American government as it has existed for 225 years. Thus has the health-care law provoked an unprecedented and unnecessary constitutional showdown that endangers individual liberty.

It is a remarkable moment. The High Court has scheduled the longest oral arguments in nearly a half-century: five and a half hours, spread over three days. Yet Democrats, the liberal legal establishment and the press corps spent most of 2010 and 2011 deriding the government of limited and enumerated powers of Article I as a quaint artifact of the 18th century. Now even President Obama and his staff seem to grasp their constitutional gamble.

Consider a White House strategy memo that leaked this month, revealing that senior Administration officials are coordinating with liberal advocacy groups to pressure the Court. "Frame the Supreme Court oral arguments in terms of real people and real benefits that would be lost if the law were overturned," the memo notes, rather than "the individual responsibility piece of the law and the legal precedence [sic]." Those nonpolitical details are merely what "lawyers will be talking about."

The White House is even organizing demonstrations during the proceedings, including a "'prayerful witness' encircling the Supreme Court." The executive branch is supposed to speak to the Court through the Solicitor General, not agitprop and crowds in the streets.

The Supreme Court will not be ruling about matters of partisan conviction, or the President's re-election campaign, or even about health care at all. The lawsuit filed by 26 states and the National Federation of Independent Business is about the outer boundaries of federal power and the architecture of the U.S. political system.

***

The argument against the individual mandate—the requirement that everyone buy health insurance or pay a penalty—is carefully anchored in constitutional precedent and American history. The Commerce Clause that the government invokes to defend such regulation has always applied to commercial and economic transactions, not to individuals as members of society.

This distinction is crucial. The health-care and health-insurance markets are classic interstate commerce. The federal government can regulate broadly—though not without limit—and it has. It could even mandate that people use insurance to purchase the services of doctors and hospitals, because then it would be regulating market participation. But with ObamaCare the government is asserting for the first time that it can compel people to enter those markets, and only then to regulate how they consume health care and health insurance. In a word, the government is claiming it can create commerce so it has something to regulate.

This is another way of describing plenary police powers—regulations of private behavior to advance public order and welfare. The problem is that with two explicit exceptions (military conscription and jury duty) the Constitution withholds such power from a central government and vests that authority in the states. It is a black-letter axiom: Congress and the President can make rules for actions and objects; states can make rules for citizens.

The framers feared arbitrary and centralized power, so they designed the federalist system—which predates the Bill of Rights—to diffuse and limit power and to guarantee accountability. Upholding the ObamaCare mandate requires a vision on the Commerce Clause so broad that it would erase dual sovereignty and extend the new reach of federal general police powers into every sphere of what used to be individual autonomy.

These federalist protections have endured despite the shifting definition and scope of interstate commerce and activities that substantially affect it. The Commerce Clause was initially seen as a modest power, meant to eliminate the interstate tariffs that prevailed under the Articles of Confederation. James Madison noted in Federalist No. 45 that it was "an addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are entertained." The Father of the Constitution also noted that the powers of the states are "numerous and infinite" while the federal government's are "few and defined."

That view changed in the New Deal era as the Supreme Court blessed the expansive powers of federal economic regulation understood today. A famous 1942 ruling, Wickard v. Filburn, held that Congress could regulate growing wheat for personal consumption because in the aggregate such farming would affect interstate wheat prices. The Court reaffirmed that precedent as recently as 2005, in Gonzales v. Raich, regarding homegrown marijuana.

The Court, however, has never held that the Commerce Clause is an ad hoc license for anything the government wants to do. In 1995, in Lopez, it gave the clause more definition by striking down a Congressional ban on carrying guns near schools, which didn't rise to the level of influencing interstate commerce. It did the same in 2000, inMorrison, about a federal violence against women statute.

A thread that runs through all these cases is that the Court has always required some limiting principle that is meaningful and can be enforced by the legal system. As the Affordable Care Act suits have ascended through the courts, the Justice Department has been repeatedly asked to articulate some benchmark that distinguishes this specific individual mandate from some other purchase mandate that would be unconstitutional. Justice has tried and failed, because a limiting principle does not exist.

The best the government can do is to claim that health care is unique. It is not. Other industries also have high costs that mean buyers and sellers risk potentially catastrophic expenses—think of housing, or credit-card debt. Health costs are unpredictable—but all markets are inherently unpredictable. The uninsured can make insurance pools more expensive and transfer their costs to those with coverage—though then again, similar cost-shifting is the foundation of bankruptcy law.

The reality is that every decision not to buy some good or service has some effect on the interstate market for that good or service. The government is asserting that because there are ultimate economic consequences it has the power to control the most basic decisions about how people spend their own money in their day-to-day lives. The next stops on this outbound train could be mortgages, college tuition, credit, investment, saving for retirement, Treasurys, and who knows what else.

***

Confronted with these concerns, the Administration has echoed Nancy Pelosi when she was asked if the individual mandate was constitutional: "Are you serious?" The political class, the Administration says, would never abuse police powers to create the proverbial broccoli mandate or force people to buy a U.S.-made car.

But who could have predicted that the government would pass a health plan mandate that is opposed by two of three voters? The argument is self-refuting, and it shows why upholding the rule of law and defending the structural checks and balances of the separation of powers is more vital than ever.

Another Administration fallback is the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause, which says Congress can pass laws to execute its other powers. Yet the Court has never hesitated to strike down laws that are not based on an enumerated power even if they're part of an otherwise proper scheme. This clause isn't some ticket to justify inherently unconstitutional actions.

In this context, the Administration says the individual mandate is necessary so that the Affordable Care Act's other regulations "work." Those regulations make insurance more expensive. So the younger and healthier must buy insurance that they may not need or want to cross-subsidize the older and sicker who are likely to need costly care. But that doesn't make the other regulations more "effective." The individual mandate is meant to offset their intended financial effects.

***

Some good-faith critics have also warned that overturning the law would amount to conservative "judicial activism," saying that the dispute is only political. This is reductive reasoning. Laws obey the Constitution or they don't. The courts ought to defer to the will of lawmakers who pass bills and the Presidents who sign them, except when those bills violate the founding document.

As for respect of the democratic process, there are plenty of ordinary, perfectly constitutional ways the Obama Democrats could have reformed health care and achieved the same result. They could have raised taxes to fund national health care or to make direct cross-subsidy transfers to sick people. They chose not to avail themselves of those options because they'd be politically unpopular. The individual mandate was in that sense a deliberate evasion of the accountability the Constitution's separation of powers is meant to protect.

Meanwhile, some on the right are treating this case as a libertarian seminar and rooting for the end of the New Deal precedents. But the Court need not abridge stare decisis and the plaintiffs are not asking it to do so. The Great Depression farmer in Wickard, Roscoe Filburn, was prohibited from growing wheat, and that ban, however unwise, could be reinstated today. Even during the New Deal the government never claimed that nonconsumers of wheat were affecting interstate wheat prices, or contemplated forcing everyone to buy wheat in order to do so.

The crux of the matter is that by arrogating to itself plenary police powers, the government crossed a line that Justice Anthony Kennedy drew in his Lopez concurrence. The "federal balance," he wrote, "is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of government has tipped the scale too far."

***

The constitutional questions the Affordable Care Act poses are great, novel and grave, as much today as they were when they were first posed in an op-ed on these pages by the Washington lawyers David Rivkin and Lee Casey on September 18, 2009. The appellate circuits are split, as are legal experts of all interpretative persuasions.

The Obama Administration and its allies are already planning to attack the Court's credibility and legitimacy if it overturns the Affordable Care Act. They will claim it is a purely political decision, but this should not sway the Justices any more than should the law's unpopularity with the public.

The stakes are much larger than one law or one President. It is not an exaggeration to say that the Supreme Court's answers may constitute a hinge in the history of American liberty and limited and enumerated government. The Justices must decide if those principles still mean something.

A version of this article appeared Mar. 23, 2012, on page A14 in some U.S. editions of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: Liberty and ObamaCare.

Source: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304724404577291762007718228.html?mod=googlenews_wsj